check this abstract and revise it if necessary: Traditional cooperation is typically enforced through obligatory interactions among individuals, yet in actuality, players have the option to participate voluntarily. When individuals become aware of their disadvantages, they may exit in order to minimize risk exposure or accept lower rewards. In this work, we introduce heterogeneous exit rights to the two-player spatial prisoner's dilemma game, in which some players have exit rights while others do not. We conducted a simulation study in a scale-free network and examined three scenarios involving different exit rights, focusing on the effect of leaders' preferential exit rights on cooperation. The results indicate that in scale-free networks, leaders priority exit weakens the advantage of large degree nodes, which is influenced by dilemma strength and network structure. Weak dilemma strength tends to inhibit cooperation because of the isolation effect of exit, while high dilemma strength tends to promote cooperation. Furthermore, the strong connectedness between high-degree nodes and small-degree nodes amplifies this effect in a disassortative network, whereas an assortative network yields the opposite result due to the high connectivity between hub nodes. This study investigates the impact of different exit rights allocations on cooperation and demonstrates that heterogeneity in exit rights can improve cooperation, revealing insights into the evolution of cooperation. Please answer in JSON format.
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